June 22 - Day of Remembrance and Grief

[zarajara]

70 years ago on this day the war began.
While the TFA.
tfu, tfu, the biggest and bloodiest of those that were.
Remember.
Noted.
They picked up the glass (some with nothing).
This day is over.
Everything.

Well, what is art, it seems, the only thing today as something in common.

[Konstantin]

tandem make you a warning.
No need to provoke a quarrel.

[Артём]

Today, spontaneously, and looked the TV series "Fortress" (Brest Fortress) - liked it.
Truth posted a couple of episodes.
Just then I remembered that today 22th.

The art seems to be the only thing today somehow united.

The only thing that unites us - love!

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=07yKGsI5bwQ

[Кирилл Сызранский]

Сообщение от Konstantin

tandem make you a warning.
No need to provoke a quarrel.

Then, too, in fairness, and sets question to do the same remark, the question of a just and
was provocative, tandem just said to him.

Is not it so?

[Grigory]

Сообщение от Ika-Ika

tandem, feel my heart, that you benderovets.
Tell me about Stepan Bandera, which he, what his eyes and smile?
Make me love him just like you.

Ika-Ika, and a warning!

[Тютчев]

Hitler and the puppet masters

June 22, 1941 - perhaps the blackest day in our history. In this case, in fact, he still had not found a rational response to the question of why Hitler invaded the Soviet Union was in 1941. Of course, pushing Germany to the east economy and geopolitics. The invasion was only a matter of time - but 1941 was not the best moment. Although the "rush to the East" was inevitable, in the presence of an active rear Britain such an action seemed obvious insanity. At the same time, the German general staff, few doubted that victory over England, even at great sacrifice and effort, it is quite likely.

Thus, the completion of the transport fleet allies began to exceed losses only from July 1943, and in May the same year the German submariners were very close to having to completely interrupt a critical need for UK shipping. Meanwhile, when the German Navy would receive only 5%of the country's steel - the rest is devoured the Eastern Front. Do not start a large-scale fighting on land, the Reich could no extraordinary efforts to scale up the construction of submarines - and in 1943 Britain would be forced to her knees. At the same time Berlin could hit the continental possessions of the British. In Iran and Turkey have a very pro-German government were modes - respectively, the little that prevented the Germans invade the Middle East, take the tongs critically important for the British threaten Egypt and India.

Nevertheless, Hitler left alone west and invaded the Soviet Union. Why? The answer is obvious - Hitler sincerely believed that the active phase of the war with Russia should take no more than six months. The answer to the question of why he believed in it, is evident in much lesser degree. The standard explanation is that Hitler was a corporal raging. However, in the first place, the military knowledge Hitler, with all the contempt, went far beyond the typical rank and file. Secondly, the German general staff was staffed nebesnovatymi neefreytorami. Nevertheless, the majority of its members shared the view that the Wehrmacht was able to achieve decisive success ... for 8-10 weeks.

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Of course, after the defeat of France among generalshteblerov present euphoric mood. However, with the Soviet Union was the location: if for a lost French border battle automatically meant the collapse, the Russian retreat to for a long time without losing the ability to resist. Neither of which eight to ten weeks or even six months could be considered.

References to the fact that after the disgrace of the Finnish Red Army in 1939 and 40th the Germans stopped to consider it as a real force, to put it mildly, flimsy. Finland is a very specific theater of operations, but that it can effectively defend the small forces, known since time immemorial. Accordingly, the only case in point could be Halkin-Gol - a great field battle in conditions close to the "standard" - and this example is impressive. As a result, the Winter War contributed to the development shapkozakidatelskih sentiment that Hitler and the Reich's political leadership, but professional attitude to her more calmly.

I refer to the author of "Barbarossa." Paulus: "Findings report (Colonel Kintselya) were built on the premise that the Red Army - a noteworthy opponent ...." German estimates of Soviet aviation, for example, rather skeptical - but no one believed her a bunch of garbage. In other words, based on objective data, the German General Staff, there were no reasons to believe that the USSR can be done away for eight to ten weeks. The problem is that just such data have not been staff officers.

Here is an excerpt from a conversation of General Vlasov and Colonel Boyarsky with German Foreign Minister Hilger on August 6, 1942.

"Decisive is the same at the moment the question whether there is an opportunity not to excuse Russian assume that Germany intends to bring down their country to the status of the colony, and they themselves turned into slaves. While the fear of this will be alive, the resistance of the Red Army will continue until complete exhaustion of its resources. The two officers did not agree with the fact that these resources are virtually exhausted today, and expressed the view that Germany does not have a true understanding of the military-economic potential of the Urals and Siberia. They are convinced that the loss of the Baku oil will be offset by oil extraction in the area between the Volga and the Ural Mountains in an amount sufficient to maintain a defensive war ... ". It is well known that the Germans had no idea about the real potential of the Urals and the Volga region of Kuzbass.

That is the plan "Barbarossa" was developed on the assumption that three-quarters of Soviet heavy industry is concentrated in the Ukraine (situation model 1913). The only area in the Mining and powerful Soviet Union was the Donbass, and the rest of the industry (in this case practically devoid of iron and steel base) was concentrated in Moscow and Leningrad industrial areas. Accordingly, it is enough to capture a surprising cast of the territory, little more than the area of ​​France - and the Russian just had nothing to fight.

To quote on this occasion entry Halder (Chief of Staff, Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht's Army v1938-1942) in his war diary: "When we were forcing the Western Dvina and Dnepr, then it will not so much about the defeat of enemy armed forces, but rather about how to pick up the enemy of his industrial areas and prevent him from using his enormous power industry and inexhaustible manpower reserves, create new armed forces. " I believe that comment is superfluous. Hardly Haider seriously believed that the year can capture the Urals and the Kuznetsk Basin.

The defeat of Moscow was an unpleasant surprise for the Germans, but then they felt that the Soviet Union kept to the old stocks, which can not be renewed. In fact, the then Goebbels statement that the USSR maintained only in supplying the Allies were not lying as such - the Germans really believed it. Almost in Berlin saw the "light of truth" only after Stalingrad.

In other words, Hitler's attack on the USSR in 1941 was the result of extremely misconceptions about the extent and location of Soviet industrial capacity. In fact, the dilemma faced by the Fuehrer in the middle of 1940, looked fundamentally different way than is modern historians.

On the one hand, Germany would begin a fairly long campaign against England. In this case it would have to contain a huge passive army in Europe - against the Soviet Union, and German troops in the Middle East would be threatened flank attack. On the other hand, the Germans thought they could bring the Soviet Union for six months before the knockout. As a result, Middle Eastern army would have found a reliable rear, and, most importantly, the land group in Europe could be reduced significantly. From this followed a seamless air force capacity and their full concentration against England, the huge increase in the production of submarines and the resumption of construction of the surface fleet. In the end, defeat the British would be quick. The choice seemed obvious.

Thus, it is ignorance about the Germans ligament Ural-Kuzbass predetermined script of World - instead of first neutralizing England, Hitler decided to quickly put an end to the Soviet Union.

Now let us ask the question strongly undervalued - as ignorance could "experience"? The scale industrial construction in the Urals more publicized than in hiding. Further, the construction involved foreign (including German!) Specialists. Finally, it was relatively easy ride on the Trans-Siberian railway, considering opposing trains of coal from the Kuzbass, and the extent of metallurgical production in the Urals could be estimated with reasonable accuracy. Meanwhile, it was a common way of German diplomatic couriers bound for Tokyo. However, the Germans seemed blind. Why?

In the vast panopticon Nazi intelligence came across very amateurish office, but the military-economic issues mainly supervised by the Abwehr - the organization more than respectable. Meanwhile, a huge industrial area - not secret military base, it can not be overlooked. Ural blindness was the most blatant, but by no means the only example. Thus, during the initial period of war the Germans were constantly confronted with weapons, whose existence was not suspected. The sheer numbers of the Red Army to the Germans was a big surprise.

In fact, the Abwehr systematically create a "customer" the idea that the instantaneous destruction of the Soviet Union is possible. But the most curious - for England there was a diametrically opposite trend. Reports of the Abwehr chief Canaris Hitler showed Britain's defensive capabilities in the radically inflated scale. In this known at least one case where a senior Abwehr officer directly appealed to the British intelligence agencies for relevant information (incidentally, it was in 1941). In fact the German military intelligence has done everything to ease the pressure on Britain and provoke an attack on the USSR. When it was done, the Abwehr, "suddenly," "sight" - already in 1941, Canaris said that the Wehrmacht would "never reach Moscow."

The top of the Abwehr was part of an extensive group of the German elite, anti-Nazi-minded, probritanski - and this relates to the "red" with gnashing of teeth. As a result, the aggression of Hitler carefully unwrapped the East - where he was so eager.

Was the Abwehr alone in his efforts? It is well known that his relationship with the British secret services - the SIS and MI5 - was very peculiar. So, in 1940, recruited abverovtsy Dusko Popov Yugoslavs as an agent in England. That, in turn, went straight to the ICU. Further adventures of the Yugoslavs without interest, but are not essential to the case. Two years later, Popov met with his supervisor and asked what to do next. The subsequent dialogue went like this:

Curator: "To find the point with British intelligence."

Popov: "I am not associated with British intelligence."

Curator (clutching his head): "Oh my God! Do you want to say that all these years, worked for the Nazis? I think I'm going crazy! "

The official history of British intelligence says that the entire German intelligence network in Britain was uncovered and the efforts of the ICU and pereverbovana MI-5. Slightly less than the official story says that the Abwehr officers' pereverbovali "much of its agents, perhaps during the actual recruitment, and did everything to the British pereverbovali others. The symbiosis between the German military intelligence and security services by British hardly be doubted. As in the Abwehr, the SIS and MI5 believed that the main enemy - is the "red", but a union between England and Germany is not only possible but also necessary.

In other words, the mystery of June 22, and other "irrational" aspects of Nazi policies is simple: the picture that the German elite saw their own efforts (and not just their own) security services, not just very different from the real - it was an alternative reality, alternative economies and the alternative geography.

Eugene Pozhidaev

http://www.rosbalt.ru/main/2011/06/22/861483.html

[Konstantin]

Сообщение от Tiutchev; 1676771"

In fact the German military intelligence has done everything to ease the pressure on Britain and provoke an attack on the USSR. When it was done, the Abwehr, "suddenly," "seen the light»

As always, "Again podgadila Englishwoman."
Their intelligence services deceive Hitler in favor of England - is doubtful.

That analysis seems to me plausible.
Why Hitler goes to war with the Soviet Union was in 1941?
Yuri ZHITORCHUK

According to the extant documents, Hitler was in preparation for aggression against the Soviet Union made plans to actively capture the living space in Russia and its follow-Germanization, but it certainly was a long-term goal the Nazis, whose implementation has been calculated for many decades. Hence the urgent need for its implementation before the end of the war with England they were not. Indeed, in these circumstances, the attack on the Soviet Union would automatically start a war on two fronts, which Hitler, mindful of the history of the German defeat in World War I, tried his best to avoid.

But the fact that at the end of the war with France, Germany has had a powerful land army, but no navy, is able to break the British supremacy at sea. In order to defeat Britain, the Germans had to drastically reduce the army and give up all material and manpower to build and strengthen aviation fleet.

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However, under this scenario, for an indefinite time, the main foreign policy objective hung - Hitler's conquest of Lebensraum in the East. After demobilization of most of the Wehrmacht could be relatively easy, but to restore the army after a while, and most importantly to achieve its previous fighting ability - a task very difficult. Yes, and Stalin at the time could achieve a significant increase in its armed forces.

Here's how to comment on the situation in his memoirs, Manstein: "The tightening of the war hidden home hazard. No one could know how long the wait will be the Soviet Union. If we took the path of reducing the army and our air tied struggle against Britain, the Soviet Union, if he had not entered the war, would stand up to the path of political blackmail. "

Possible outcome of a strategic impasse Hitler had two. Or in the lightning war to break the Soviet Union, eliminating a potential threat from the East. After that, as wrongly believed Hitler, Britain would have to go to her proposed peace terms.

Or, as proposed by Admiral Raeder, taking Egypt and depriving England of the last major base in the eastern Mediterranean to make Turkey an alliance with Germany. After that, going to the southern borders of the Soviet Union threaten strike Wehrmacht Soviet oil fields in the Caucasus.

Nevertheless, Hitler chose the "Barbarossa". The fact that the adoption option Roeder at least a year delayed start of the war with Russia. And during that time Stalin could significantly increase the combat capability of the Red Army. In addition, he felt a mortal danger to its southern borders and by agreement with Churchill - to start a preventive war against Germany and, above all, to capture the Romanian oil fields.

Even more clearly the reason for Germany's attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, it was stated in the memoirs of Keitel, "Our land forces stood idle. After the defeat of France, she had no opponent in Europe, and it was obvious that we could not keep it indefinitely in a state of mobilization, but no use. This seemed extremely Fuehrer favorable opportunity to put an end to Bolshevism. "

Thus, the reason Nazi attack on the USSR in 1941 was to try a military solution to a complex of short, medium and long-term goals of Nazi policy.

[Сергей Дородный]

It is believed that Hitler ( or Germany ) is not enough living space.

Looked - Poland - 312 km2.
                  Germany - 358 km2.
                  France -551 km2.

Tourist Office , taking half Polish and half in France , Germany, exactly doubled its territory. Little? And if there was such a terrible (Germany ), then would not negotiate with the Soviet Union , and to seize the whole of Poland . And all of France - the last good army is broken. And the area have increased fourfold.
But, according to the witty observation of Suvorov, Hitler did not need the Cognac and Champagne, did not need Marseille, from which to American shores in 1000 miles closer than from Brest (this is the shortage of fuel in Germany ) do not need a Azur - Vsegermanskogo sanatorium for wounded ---- no, drew his village Chmarovka on which the swamp 3km to Zmeyukino .
Geopolitics first!

[Кирилл Сызранский]

Сообщение от Sergei burly

Germany - 358 km2.

This is a modern area, without Prussia, Lower Silesia and Czech, a large part of Pomerania, Alsace, the Sudetenland.

And if you still remember the Anschluss of 1938, it is possible to imagine a pre-war territory of the Reich.

[Konstantin]

Сообщение от Sergei burly; 1677791"

no, drew his village Chmarovka

Very good question, but this is a good answer.

«In early 1941, Hitler had so much land that no longer knew what to do with it. In its submission were: Austria, Czechoslovakia, much of Poland, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, half of France, the Channel Islands of Great Britain, Yugoslavia and Greece. Under the influence of Germany were Finland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. Furthermore, German troops were fighting in North Africa. He was a little ground ...

Picked up so much for the half year, to not think about the new lands, and the retention captured. "

However, it is reasonable to ask Vladimir Bogdanovich, and perhaps by occupying almost half of Europe, Hitler, while still intends to join with Germany most of his troops conquered territory?

Yes FIGS he needed to, say, France, of course, with the exception of Alsace and Lorraine, who originally believed the Fuhrer of German territory. That, apart from a headache, would join the Hitler of Germany over France. Reich would have made a multiethnic state, but this is completely contrary to Nazi ideology. Would increase the living space of the Germans, so far as the French, then would you do with this when, in Siberia to deport? But they will not let go Stalin.

After Hitler's conquest in the understanding of the living space was reduced in the process of Germanization of the annexed territory, ie, forced to replace much of racial inferiority of indigenous representatives in genetically sturdy Aryan race.

And still recall how the Nazis behaved in the occupied European territories and to the east.