Anniversary of the Battle for South Ossetia.

The anniversary of the battle for South Ossetia. Aggressors and victims.
discuss Alexander Sharavin and Andrei Illarionov.
  06.08.2009 20:00

Mikhail Sokolov: In our program today are involved - the director of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis Alexander Sharavin, a retired colonel and senior fellow at the Cato Institute, president of the Institute of Economic Analysis, Andrei Illarionov us by telephone from St. Petersburg.
We'll talk about what the country had come a year after the Russo-Georgian war. August 6 last year, South Ossetian forces opened mortar fire at Georgian villages Eredvi, Preece, Avnevi, Dhwani and Zeros. And actually, the events began to develop, in my opinion, is already on the unmanaged scenario.
I asked to begin our conversation with versions sat down to war: who is the aggressor, who is the victim. Or was it a mutual encounter battle the forces of Russia and Georgia on the ground in South Ossetia. And let's start with the military expert Alexander Sharavin.
 
Alexander Sharavin: I think that today it is almost all clear that, at least formally, but in general, and really was the aggressor, Georgia. Because it has done a massive attack on Tskhinvali, on civilians, and most importantly, on the peacekeepers. That fact of the attack on the peacekeepers, I think, in international relations is very rare. And I think that he could not but provoke a reaction. And I want to say that if Russia had not responded militarily, then it would not have understood not only our fellow citizens, but those same NATO has, and the United States. Therefore, in terms of use of force by Russia, I personally see every reason for this.
And if you talk about whether to blame Russia at all in this war, then partly yes. Because it would be better if Russia still prevented this war, if it was not. Well, they say that maybe she did not want or could not prevent, but that's a separate issue. And in short, I believe that in this case Russia's actions were entirely lawful, and especially at the stage when she tried to reflect the actions of Georgian troops to Tskhinvali.
 
Mikhail Sokolov: I will clarify. That is your version of the official Russia's something still different, or not?
 
Alexander Sharavin: It is distinguished by the fact that I, for one, thought and still think that we did not make sense to move the administrative border between South Ossetia and Georgia, and in exactly the same - between Abkhazia and Georgia. If, in the end, this border was crossed, which aroused a strong reaction main international community, I do not know why were not achieved those goals, of which many are saying that the alleged main purpose of this war was to overthrow the regime of Saakashvili. That's when my side of Russia is really incomprehensible.
 
Mikhail Sokolov: Andrei N. Illarionov, the author of the report on the events Russo-Georgian war. Please, your arguments and your version.
 
Andrei Illarionov: I think that you can start the same way I started Alexander, saying that now, for anyone of any objectively and impartially examines the events of the war, which is not opened on August 7 last year and ended on August 12 last year, it is clear that Russia was the aggressor. The fact is that there is absolutely unambiguous definition of aggression given by the General Assembly of the United Nations in December 1974, which contains an exhaustive list of phenomena that fall under the definition of "aggression". These are: the intersection of the armed forces of a State as internationally-recognized border, the bombing of the armed forces of one State against the territory of another State, the sending of armed men, mercenaries, volunteers, as you wish them to call it subversive activities against another State - all this falls under the definition of aggression .
If we look at whether any of these events carried out by Georgia against Russia, it is clear that there is. Georgian troops have not crossed an internationally recognized by the Georgia-Russia border, the Georgian military aircraft and military did not bombed the territory of Russia, the Georgian special services do not engage in terrorist acts and subversive acts in the territory of Russia. The Georgian authorities have failed to mercenaries, volunteers, Cossacks, and anyone else on the territory of Russia to carry out subversive acts. All this, as well as many others had done on the other side - from Russia's side against Georgia.
Therefore, for any again, fair-minded person, objective person, especially the military, a legal specialist is quite clear that the aggression was committed by Russia against Georgia.

Mikhail Sokolov: Well, let us then try to hold debates. Alexander Sharavin, you've heard the opinion of Andrei Illarionov. Do you have any objections?
I would have paid attention to one detail of what preceded these events - is that the authorities in South Ossetia for 5 days prior to the escalation of conflicts in various administrative boundary line of the then opposition began a massive evacuation of civilians from areas of future military action. On the other hand, in the North Caucasus in the same time began the mobilization of so-called volunteers. This, of course, suggests that the conflict was prepared.
 
Alexander Sharavin: I think that the conflict is certainly prepared. And if Russia's military is not prepared for this conflict, they generally would not have been professional and would not be worthy of any of our attention and discussion. Of course, all military preparations. Similarly prepared Georgians. And there is ample evidence that they were preparing plans for military action against South Ossetia and Abkhazia. And this is nothing strange there. Similarly, preparing Russia's troops, who had certain obligations to those unrecognized states, which at that time were.
It would be all very nice, as Andrew says, and perhaps could accept it if the de facto we have already more than 15 years did not have two independent states - it Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And these states, in general, existed during this time or in a peaceful situation, or not very peaceful situation. Even if you say the same about South Ossetia (currently leave aside so far from Abkhazia), and there, at least from 1992 to 2004, no military conflict was not. In fact, 12 years of peaceful life, which, of course, were not smooth and stable, but, in general, some processes were to achieve peace by agreement and so on. But then the situation has evolved quite differently.
And if you say that all States that have so far not been recognized, may be prone to aggression, well, let us then we would welcome an immediate military invasion of, say, China in Taiwan, and then it too would be great. And if Andrew welcomes these actions, well, well.

Mikhail Sokolov: Andrei, I think you have, of course, some objections.

Andrei Illarionov: I, on the one hand, of course, there are relevant comments, but I would not like to look around our conversation in such a way as one of the participants in the transfer of Russian authorities is a lawyer and the other party to send a lawyer Georgian authorities. I think more importantly, at least as far as possible, an objective analysis of what happened and see what really happened and who is as prepared.
There was a phrase that both sides were prepared, and the Georgian side is prepared in exactly the same as Russia's side. There are known data, nearly complete lists (or nearly complete lists) Russian units of the armed forces who participated in military operations on Georgian territory around South Ossetia and then in Central Georgia, Abkhazia, in Western Georgia - Black Sea Fleet, Military air force, missile troops, and so on. The total number of these forces together, obviously, with support troops reached perhaps 80 thousand people.
All the Georgian armed forces were at that time, apparently, about 30 thousand people. And all this power, including support, and those parts that could not participate in hostilities. At the same time the first brigade of the Georgian Armed Forces, the most capable, most well-prepared, was at this time in Iraq, several thousand kilometers away from Georgia. When preparing an operation, when preparing an attack, when preparing a war, do not send the best trained military units for thousands of kilometers. Other parts were the best trained just in western Georgia, on the contrary, in fact, the Abkhaz front, expecting an attack from there. And just parts that were in the center of Georgia, attracting literally at the last moment - August 7, from 2 hours and 30 minutes in the afternoon. In other words, if you are preparing an operation, so do not prepare the operation.
It was found that the Georgian defense minister was forced to return to Georgia just a day or two before the operation because he was on leave. So do not prepare the operation. Georgian President Saakashvili was going to fly out the morning of August 7 in Beijing for the opening of the Olympic Games, which was going to hold diplomatic talks with the leaders of the world states, including the prevention of military conflict. So do not prepare the armed forces. 6-7 August Saakashvili Vashadze and many other leaders of the State of Georgia held on the phones, obzvanivaya international observers obzvanivaya representatives of international organizations, obzvanivaya foreign ministers in order to receive advice and recommendations on how to get rid of, to avoid a war, who attacked them with all parties. So do not prepare for war.
Aug. 6, Mr. Saakashvili tried to communicate with Mr Medvedev in his last attempt almost avert war and to discuss those provocations, which were South Ossetian forces. Russia's Foreign Ministry responded coolly to the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which organizes the talks between the presidents of that time to talk about the presidents had not yet come. So do not conduct training for war. And there are plenty of other examples of how the Georgian side was largely caught by surprise, and in fact, was forced into a feverish mode to make a plan. By the way, the plan of operation in South Ossetia, apparently drafted in from 2 pm on August 7. And the examples can be given.
On the other hand, we see how Russia and Ossetian and Abkhaz sides have been preparing not for a few days, not weeks or even months, and for many years. I mention the latter fact to enable the distinguished Alexander Alexandrovich comment, he mentioned that in South Ossetia from 1992 to 2004 there was a peaceful break. In general, you can agree with that. Indeed, the number of conflicts and provocations in South Ossetia was small enough at this time. That is what has allowed the former president of South Ossetia Ludwig Chibirov and former president of the Republic of Georgia Eduard Shevardnadze to hold three meetings and to prepare a diplomatic document, entitled "Baden", since it was signed in a suburb of Vienna, the city of Baden, who coordinated the return of South Ossetia on the Rights of the extended autonomy of Georgia. It was the signing of this document and initialing in July 2000, in fact, put a cross rather than a peaceful period of development in South Ossetia, but, in fact, the political fate of Mr. Chibirova. Because after that Russia's government set the goal to provoke a war. And for this, in 2001, Russian intelligence operation began by establishing Mr. Kokoity as president of South Ossetia and prevent the election of Mr. Chibirova as president of South Ossetia.

 
Mikhail Sokolov: Andrei, I think that after all Alexander has to answer you.

Andrei Illarionov: This is what happened in January-February 2003. When Russia has put a huge batch of heavy weaponry, including tanks T-55 ", heavy artillery, multiple launch rocket system fire on South Ossetian territory.
 
Alexander Sharavin: Andrei Nikolaevich, can I have two words to you objection?

Mikhail Sokolov: Andrei, I have just had to take disciplinary action for you and send word to Mr. Sharavin.
However, I also noticed that it mentioned the word "plans". And I, for example, as an observer who is interested in military theory, has always struck this story. Suppose, Georgia, in fact, preparing to retake the territory. But in terms of military strategy, it is impossible to win without cutting off the only road, which could act and military aid, and any other from Russia, that is - the Roki Tunnel. No attempt to block the Roki tunnel was not done. Perhaps Mr. Sharavin, as a military specialist, we explain it.
 
Alexander Sharavin: Michael, I, first and foremost, I would like to answer your question. Attempts were of course. Another thing is that they have not been successful. The question is.
That's what Andrew said to now, these questions would be absolutely true. I could have just said about the Russian troops: do not prepare for war. A single fact. When preparing for war, the General Staff is not moving for a new place, not sitting in the orchestra pit, not sitting in the medical rooms and deprived of context. And this one fact, I think, enough. It is clear that the war Russia at the moment is not prepared. More than that, I am absolutely confident that Russia's military thought that Georgia would not dare to attack in this case, would not dare to open fire on the peacekeepers and the civilian population in general, to take the offensive. They knew that Georgia was also being prepared, but they were not ... Here I am, for example, as a military expert, was sure that Georgia would not dare. Moreover, I interviewed dozens of military from different European countries, including the Americans (though this is not Europe), whether they believed in what they can to attack the Georgians. And they said no. And in principle, no military could not justify to me why Georgia had dared to attack. Here is the main fact, because Russia is not the first struck "Grad" by Georgian forces ...
 
Mikhail Sokolov: And what about the South Ossetian shelling of Georgian villages? Well, if it was a spontaneous thing. Vvozmozhno, the answer to it was the Georgian counter-attack.
 
Alexander Sharavin: I bring a little fact. That's what wrote «The Boston Globe» in November 2008, the reports of the OSCE observer: "Those observers who were in the breakaway South Ossetia on the night of the 7 th of August 8, reported that they saw how the Georgian artillery and massed rocket launchers to the border with South Ossetia at 3 pm on August 7, long before the first column of Russia came into the enclave. They also witnessed the unprovoked shelling of South Ossetian capital, the evening of that day, the shells fell on the inhabitants, who were hiding in their homes. Observers have not heard anything that would Saakashvili confirmed that the Georgian shelling of Tskhinvali was a response to the shelling of Georgian villages. There is no reason to doubt the competence of the observers. Moreover, they say they can not confirm that was the Georgian shelling of these villages. Nobody confirmed except for the Saakashvili. I think that this, in principle, sufficient.
Moreover, the Georgian side after the first few days, not only in any orders not to say that they are going to reflect aggression or attack any Russian troops, and they are in their propaganda about it in the early days did not say anything. It later emerged the version that they claim to Strike Back at Russia's aggression. That is what then Andrei could explain this?
 
Andrei Illarionov: The four items that were mentioned here, each of them a short answer. As the General Staff is preparing for war. The General Staff of Russia is not ready for this war, because war was preparing to head the North Caucasus Military District, located in Vladikavkaz, the advance team, which was launched on August 6 near the village of Java. It was from there advance team staff of the North Caucasus region arranged to operate in the territory of South Ossetia and in Central Georgia. The headquarters of the Leningrad military district on August 6 has been posted in Abkhazia, in the lower Kodori Gorge. It was he who planned the operation in Abkhazia, in the upper Kodori Gorge, and then in western Georgia.
In other words, Russia's Defense Ministry believed that it would be a military operation, but the relatively modest scale. The aim was to present this operation as something akin to civil war, similar to the beginning of the first Chechen war, or so-called Abkhaz war of 1992-1993. Only abruptly increased scale of military operations and the unexpected huge losses suffered by the columns of so-called volunteers, Cossacks and the North Ossetians, who moved to TransKAMu, Zar and Gerskoy Road 7 th, 8 th, 9 August, led Russia's prime minister to leave city of Beijing and immediately fly to Vladikavkaz, and to mobilize all possible resources, ability to conduct military operations, in order to realize maximum advantage of the armed forces and armaments of the Georgian army.
Second. Are the fire on the peacekeepers. Indeed, the fire on the peacekeepers do not lead, and it is difficult to imagine. And the Americans were right in saying that this can not imagine. This can not imagine the Georgians, because the Georgians were not fired on the peacekeepers. As elaborated in detail and told the commander of Russian peacekeeping battalion Konstantin Timerman, received for this operation Hero Russia, the order of firing against Georgian troops, he received early in the first night of August 8. He is fairly detailed account of how he received the order. And because this order was, quite frankly, an unusual, if not stronger, he pereutochnil, he re-checked, whether he understood the order from the commander of the mixed units of peacekeepers stationed in Tskhinvali, General Marat Kulakhmetov. Mr. Kulakhmetov confirmed that the captain ordered Timerman understood correctly. And after that subordinates Timerman said that they were ordered to fight to the death and to prevent the passage of Georgian troops and Georgian police to the territory of Tskhinvali. Judging by the fact that the area is 6 am from the territory of Russia's so-called Southern or "top" of peacekeeping camp were being fired Ossetian units and there were observers for the South Ossetian units, which were fired against Georgian parts, respectively, one of the first tank fire, this Observer South Ossetia, which was located on the roof of a building peacekeeping battalion, was impressed.
The third point with regard to OSCE observers, who were in Tskhinvali. First, they were only three. And this is not enough to monitor and record all the number of violations, all the attacks that took place at this time. And actually, even their report, which was hosted by the way, August 8 at the OSCE (the truth, then he was shot) reported that the attacks actually carried out, but they, in their view, have not been sufficiently intense that from their point of view, would be sufficient to cause return fire. In other words, themselves, OSCE observers have recognized the existence of ongoing attacks by South Ossetian armed forces, but from their point of view, it was not strong enough heavy shelling. And what is quite intense, not intense, of course, better ask the military experts. But the fact remains - the shelling had.
Moreover, if we look not only to the OSCE observers, and to Russia's journalists, who number about 50 people were in Tskhinvali, the evening of 7 August, all of them without exception said that the shelling in the vicinity of Tskhinvali began at about 6.30 pm, and it lasted until midnight, gradually growing. Moreover, the bombardment was approaching, became stronger. Thus, many of the journalists who first heard of such intense gunfire experienced, incidentally, a very unpleasant feeling.
 
Mikhail Sokolov: Andrey, let's now Mr Sharavin you a brief answer, and we move on to today's situation.
 
Alexander Sharavin: Andrei, I want to say that you have done a great job. I have carefully read your report. You are now reading it, and it is nice to hear that man has done and is ready to work on her report. But we do today, in general, have agreed to debate, but not to read those documents which we had previously prepared.
 
Mikhail Sokolov: Well, do not hurt ...
 
Alexander Sharavin: Just for this it is impossible to argue when you read all sorts of facts that can be in a heap, so to speak, assemble.
It turns out that we did not have the fact of Georgian attack on Tskhinvali, which really was not fired "Castle", there was no shelling, Georgian tanks were not included in Tskhinvali, not killing civilians ...
 
Mikhail Sokolov: This excuse about the killing - it's you first said. First, were named some horrific figures about 2 thousand dead.
 
Alexander Sharavin: let's not engage in propaganda.

Mikhail Sokolov: And now much less. Even Mr Barankiewicz their numbers declined, and prosecutors declined.
 
Alexander Sharavin: If, say, one hundred and fifty people were killed ...

Mikhail Sokolov: This is terrible. And in Georgia, died ...
 
Alexander Sharavin: And if our 15 peacekeepers were killed - is not that awful? And Marat Kulakhmetov just said that he was just a few minutes before the fire called the Georgian side and said that now would be offensive on Tskhinvali. He does not deny. Well, what can be done during those few minutes? And how should it respond? He must miss the tanks and let the troops in Tskhinvali, so there killed civilians?
 
Mikhail Sokolov: But there was no genocide.
 
Alexander Sharavin: In connection with the genocide are not going to argue, let the lawyers argue about this. But today there are maps and documents that are officially submitted to the Russians, their identity is confirmed by European specialists, on which our peacekeepers are listed as a target for destruction. Some civilian objects are listed as goals, intended for destruction. On this case. And in principle, to argue something is not worth it.
I think we are not talking about the main. After all, who fired the first shot?
 
Mikhail Sokolov: And you do not agree, I'm sure. And this debate, I think, is counterproductive.

 
Alexander Sharavin: I would like to ask Andrei Nikolaevich, he recognizes the fact at least, that was really a massive rocket and artillery bombardment of Tskhinvali, which was to seize the city by Georgian troops, and repeated seizure. And if the Georgian side was so weak and unprepared, how is it such powerful Russian military, and even with the Ossetians defeated. Although we know very well that, say, South Ossetian army, together with the Abkhaz was numerically smaller in the more than 2 times than Georgian.
 
Mikhail Sokolov: Andrew, please, please, and we move on to this day still.
 
Andrei Illarionov: I still would like to answer that question, which I could not answer because I was not allowed to.
 
Mikhail Sokolov: I know your perseverance.
 
Andrei Illarionov: Official Statement of the Government of Georgia was made public at 2 am on Aug. 8, which clearly sets out the aims and objectives of a military operation in South Ossetia.
 
Mikhail Sokolov: So you do not deny that the military operation was offensive?
 
Andrei Illarionov: It was a military operation, no one denies. And in my opinion, the Government of Georgia talked about this. But it was a defensive operation, according to their data, according to their official statement, above all, to protect the civilian population of the Georgian enclaves, particularly the main enclave, which was located north of Tskhinvali.
 
Mikhail Sokolov: Well, of course. So now these enclaves are not already, the Georgian population was expelled, the ethnic cleansing took place - this is one of the results of this war.
 
Andrei Illarionov: But that does not mean that the goal, which was formulated, was correct. That is, they assessed the objective - a danger for the Georgian civilian population - are absolutely adequate.
 
Mikhail Sokolov: But the war was lost.
 
Andrei Illarionov: No one expected to win the war against Russia, a military capacity which only conventional weapons in more than 100 times greater than the military potential of Georgia.
 
Mikhail Sokolov: That's the strange thing - how you can start a war, do not expect to win.
 
Andrei Illarionov: I can answer, Michael, how you can start a war, do not expect to win. If you are in the evening, walking late at night with his wife (or his girlfriend), and you are attacked by a gang of bandits, then you start to fight with this gang of bandits, not expecting to win, but hoping to defend the most dear to you man.
 
Mikhail Sokolov: Vitaly from Volgograd, we wrote, the question on the topic of the day: "Is it likely outbreak of the Second Russo-Georgian war? In my opinion, both sides are not satisfied with the results of the first collision. Georgian elite want revenge, revenge. And Russia is not averse to change the regime of Saakashvili.
Indeed, a senior General Nogovitsyn, said: "Georgia - the aggressor, and Georgia's leadership must be held for this punishment." If such things says the general, it is almost an ultimatum. On the other hand, Mikhail Kasyanov, former prime minister, also made a statement today: "With Georgia on the border remains volatile situation. The hostilities could erupt again at any moment. "
Alexander, you as a soldier, yet it must be analyzed.
 
Alexander Sharavin: I think that the likelihood of war is very small. And despite what some military analysts say that the war was already practically, we can say is declared, it is about to begin, well, talking about it long ago. In particular, Andry said that a month ago to start a war.
 
Mikhail Sokolov: It is said that all Obama has discussed it with Medvedev and Putin.
 
Alexander Sharavin: One of our independent military analyst said that the Georgian army, as of August 2008 - is the best army in the former Soviet Union.
 
Mikhail Sokolov: And now Russia's military says it has restored its full potential.
 
Alexander Sharavin: No, it does not restore its full potential.
 
Mikhail Sokolov: So, tell lies?
 
Alexander Sharavin: They say that it is trying to restore its capacity.
 
Mikhail Sokolov: How? I quote. Here Kokoity also said: "The military potential of Georgia is stronger and higher than before August 2008.
 
Alexander Sharavin: Well, I do Kokoity would not undertake to comment on.
 
Mikhail Sokolov: Do not you respect?
 
Alexander Sharavin: At least, our General Staff said that ... I do not respect just Kokoity. And I want to say that we have nothing to Andrei Nikolaevich not talking about the political outcome of this war. Because, in fact, I think that in this matter we would greatly agreed. Because the benefits for Russia, I think we have not received any. And from the fact that Russia used force in this manner, as it did, and it is on such a scale, as it did, I think that it is the special dividend is not earned. Moreover, the strategic plan is, of course, lost.

Mikhail Sokolov: So you are against the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia?
 
Alexander Sharavin: I believe that this step was made on time, at least.
 
Mikhail Sokolov: Well, let's take on the political implications and the possibility of a new war talk. Andrei Illarionov, please, your opinion.
 
Andrei Illarionov: I still would have commented on the fact that I asked. Maps, referred to by Alexander, exist only in the imagination of some representatives of Russia's General Staff, who are trying to sell the fake international journalists, international observers. If only one such map existed, it would have been published long ago. It would have been published by any other documents. These maps do not exist.
Regarding the so-called call General Kulakhmetov, then, in fact, the situation was somewhat different. Not Mr. Kurashvili called General Kulakhmetov, and General Kulakhmetov called General Kurashvili with the appropriate question. This is from the words of General Kulakhmetov went statement: "It seems we have started a war. The Georgian government has not made such statements.
 
Mikhail Sokolov: Andrei, and Vitali something you answer about the second Russo-Georgian war?
 
Andrei Illarionov: Now I'll answer, of course. And with regard to attacks on "Grad", indeed, the Georgian forces used "Grad" mainly in parts, moving along the Zar, Gerskoy roads and TransKAMu. As for the Russian "Grad", they were used against Tskhinvali, against residential areas, including the towns against the peacekeepers. I think many of our radio listeners will be quite surprised when, after some time will have documentary evidence that Russia's "Grad" shelled northern town, just the same town where he was General Kulakhmetov, where there was a sufficiently large number of Russian journalists and which was in this time, quite a large group of civilians. There is documentary evidence that Russia's "Grad" firing Russia's northern town of peacekeepers. We have many more amazing facts of this war, not ended the war, about which many of our citizens, many of our radio listeners do not know. When these facts are made public, will be known, to prove the unprovable will be much harder.
 
Mikhail Sokolov: Andrei, you once again urge the listener to respond.
 
Andrei Illarionov: As a new war, the risk of a new war actually exists. My prediction that was made, but which, unfortunately, was incorrectly quoted, is that after July 6 (no 6 July, and after July 6) is significantly increasing the risk of war. And judging by what a series of provocations took place during the last week, perhaps this prediction is well founded. The fact that the main goal, which placed Russia's leadership, in fact, not last year, but at least in 2001, and possibly much earlier, has not yet been achieved. Then, by the way, the goal was not to displace the regime of Saakashvili. Mr. Saakashvili was not in Georgia. The purpose was to another - in the actual legalization of property rights to objects of recreational infrastructure on the territory of Abkhazia, namely, boarding houses, motels and Defense Ministry, Interior Ministry, Security Service ...
 
Mikhail Sokolov: A Ossetia something for which we all?
 
Andrei Illarionov: The fact is that in order to ensure a balance in the fight against Georgia, the need was still the second balance - this is South Ossetia. And it was from the territory of South Ossetia to Tbilisi, the distance is much shorter than that of Abkhazia. And besides, Abkhazia and western Georgia from the center of Georgia from the Georgian capital separates Rikotsky pass from Rikotskim tunnel.
 
Alexander Sharavin: Andrei why Tbilisi do not have last year?
 
Mikhail Sokolov: Here's a good question: why not take Tbilisi?
 
Andrei Illarionov: Who? Russia's troops?
 
Alexander Sharavin: Of course.
 
Andrei Illarionov: There are several reasons. The fact is that considered two options. There was a minimum program, and she realized: the purpose of training the territory of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, legalization, causing maximum damage to civilian and military infrastructure of Georgia. I hope that in circumstances where blocked the main highway west-east, the Georgian state can not endure - and it happens inside a shipwreck. There were high expectations and the Georgian opposition, and the internal disturbance, and so on, to supply shortages of basic foodstuffs and fuel, to destroy the financial system. And for that, would not need to take Tbilisi, which would be quite bloody, it would be very noisy, would cause a very strong negative reaction around the world. Internal collapse of the regime would be much more spectacular.
 
Alexander Sharavin: Andrei, not linked, because ...
 
Andrei Illarionov: I am trying to answer your question ...
 
Alexander Sharavin: But you say 3 times longer than I, and maybe in 4. I can not ever say something or not? So let me do not talk.
 
Mikhail Sokolov: Andrey, I still ask to give an opportunity to respond.
 
Andrei Illarionov: Please.
 
Mikhail Sokolov: I still ask how a humane treat us.
And I want to still put another question, which was sent to us by the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Because now it's all paid for out of Russia's budget. That Russia has allocated for reconstruction in South Ossetia, more than 10 billion rubles. I have here is a quote from Friday's issue of "Izvestia" (absolutely pro-Kremlin newspaper), where the reporter wrote: "No broken private house with the money never recovered." The roofs, which restored the "Chechenstroy" flow. "The road through the Roki Tunnel - continuous ruts and potholes." That is the witness shows that virtually all of what is given there, Kokoity regime somewhere detonation. Do not want to say the word "stolen". Here is the price of the content of these two entities is unclear which of Russia's budget, it is high enough now, in times of crisis?

 
Alexander Sharavin: I think that just the problem of South Ossetia today that it is trying to portray himself of an independent state. Russia would be more consistent if she joined the South Ossetia with North ...
 
Mikhail Sokolov: That is - to annex it.
 
Alexander Sharavin: Yes, you can be called for today it is. I would then understand at least the logic of action. And in this case it is a "black hole", which leave huge amounts of money. Moreover, it turns out, as they say: ears waving ass - just such a situation. And this problem for us absolutely unconscionable. And not for nothing that President Medvedev flew there, because, of course, look at destroyed houses a year after the war, when it was released huge amounts of money ...
 
Mikhail Sokolov: And in Georgia, everything is restored.
 
Alexander Sharavin: The fact of the matter is that in Georgia, restored, and we have - no. And it just says that the result we wanted or did not want to achieve, we have achieved. Indeed, this result is unfortunate, because we have lost the image of Russia today, we have a big problem in the international arena. And most importantly, we have those two countries, which today can hardly be called independent states ...
 
Mikhail Sokolov: which are "not on the map.
 
Alexander Sharavin: Oops. And even if the prospects of Abkhazia as an independent state quite probably feasible, then with respect to South Ossetia, I personally can not imagine South Ossetia as an independent state.
 
Andrei Illarionov: Having traveled to Tskhinvali, Mr Medvedev made not only a crime by making intersection an internationally recognized Russia-Georgia border.
 
Mikhail Sokolov: But Turkish leaders also travel to Northern Cyprus.
 
Andrei Illarionov: The fact that other leaders make mistakes, stupidity and crime, there is no reason to ensure that our leaders have committed the same folly, error and crime.
As for costs, these costs were not only in the last year, the figures are so well known in the past, at least four years, until 2008, since that of 2004, which was mentioned earlier, military spending South Ossetia is about 200%of gross domestic product, according to conservative estimates. It is clear that no South Ossetian economy was unable to make a hundredth part of what was spent on armaments. All these funds were transferred from Russia to free the budget.
I remind you that not only the territory of South Ossetia, but also on the territory of Russia carried huge costs associated with the South Ossetians, the Abkhaz, with the Georgian military problem. Recall that in 2006, was adopted by Presidential Decree on the establishment of two Infantry Brigade - Botlikh and Zelenchuk. And they were actually created. The challenge was set - that these teams were created to December 1, 2007. It is to 1 December 2007 were withdrawn from Georgia Akhalkalaki and Batumi bases. It is to this date, Russia has withdrawn from the CFE treaty.

Mikhail Sokolov: Andrei, you are once again abusing his text. And I still have to interrupt you here. I understand everything, but we have students ...
 
Andrei Illarionov: I would like to remind expenditure. These two teams - Botlikh and Zelenchukskaya - number 9 thousand people have cost Russia's budget of $ 1 billion.
 
Mikhail Sokolov: Let's put a point here. This is understandable - a billion dollars.
 
Andrei Illarionov: exactly what were the costs of Georgia in the peak year of military spending during the war in 2008.
 
Mikhail Sokolov: Rakhmanov from the Moscow region, please.
 
listener: Good evening. I want to ask Illarionov. The merit of it in the destruction of the Soviet Union, as he thinks ...
 
Mikhail Sokolov: Rakhmanov, let us not talk about the Soviet Union. Russia has own problems.
 
Alexander Sharavin: And a few words about these two motorized infantry brigades. Because that's really the problem. What we were doing PR on these two mountain rifle brigades, but you've seen any reports in the press, on television how they acted bravely Brigade ...
 
Mikhail Sokolov: Well, they're not at war?
 
Alexander Sharavin: There was, at least, Reconn one of these teams, first went into it. And to my knowledge, at least one of the teams was there involved. But I think that since we have spent so many resources and so much engaged in PR about their creation, it would be nice to show our taxpayers, as these teams have shown themselves during the war here. I think that's about it should talk.
And another important point. They say: "How is that, if the Georgian army was so good, what's the problem, why she could not cope with these challenges?". I think also for us a very important conclusion, and we are about it, too, must say. Because you can prepare soldiers for 4-5 years, and indeed the Georgian army was well prepared individually for ...

Mikhail Sokolov: Maybe it badly commanded?
 
Alexander Sharavin: But it commanded bad. Because the officer for 4-5 years can not prepare, the more so - the general, and his 10 years can not prepare. That the Georgian army was not worthy of the officers and generals of the forces that have been created ...
 
Mikhail Sokolov: And that, Russia's army fought qualitatively if the headquarters of the army was ambushed by special police? The journalists were repulsed, the commander of the army was under BTRom - it is a normal war?
 
Alexander Sharavin: This is completely abnormal at the level of generals. And I want to say that not very much our military have expressed themselves. But the middle link at the company commanders, battalion, regiment acted very professionally. And they actually pulled the whole situation from a very bad ...
 
Mikhail Sokolov: Well, add another - Chechen detachments.
 
Alexander Sharavin: Well, the Chechen troops, by the way, acting is not always as good as they write and speak. Because they still know how to do PR.
But as for our military, I want to say that we just have to conclude that our officers to take care of today. Because it is very easy to disperse them, and replace those mythical sergeants, referred to by our Minister of Defense, will not soon. And the actual contract soldiers are good when they occur. That the Georgian army was just it showed. When they carried out raids on Tskhinvali, they acted swiftly, decisively and professionally. But when they needed to defend against a superior enemy, they just ran away, that's all.
 
Mikhail Sokolov: Or fulfill the order to retreat.
Lyudmila, please. A woman's voice is sure to grace our broadcast.
 
listener: Good evening. It is known that instigate war freaks, and people suffer. I want to ask Alexander, a military analyst. How can the creators of the world to speak only about some Ossetians? In my opinion, they should save all citizens. Even in school, I was personally surprised at how little Finland could attack the USSR. And then it became clear that we were attacked. And the question: how many were killed all civilians, and with that, and on the other side?
 
Mikhail Sokolov: But really, what are the losses, Alexander, your data? Georgian civilians, the Georgian military, Russia's military, Ossetian ... There are numbers accurate?
 
Alexander Sharavin: I memorized these figures do not remember. I want to say that, of course, the loss of Georgian civilians more than Ossetian. Well, no more, and about the same number of casualties among the peaceful population in Georgia and among the peaceful population of South Ossetia.
With regard to the losses of war, they are also known, in general, to every soldier. And I want to say that in this case just the loss of the Georgian side more than Russia's side. Indeed, it is not talking about what is good or bad, but it is really bad. And our radioslushatelnitsa said that freaks instigate war. And I have a major claim in time for the Russia side for what she fought poorly when it comes to the High Command and the top leadership, and I said that it was cooked badly. Because it was a challenge, as a country which guarantees peace in the former Soviet Union (at least, she proclaims it), it did not reach this goal.
 
Mikhail Sokolov: Here you are with Andrei Illarionov clearly diverged. Andrey, please, your opinion about the losses and the results again.
 
Andrei Illarionov: At present, data on losses, at least, civilians are known to one person. Among the population of South Ossetia killed 162 civilians. This large number, this is undoubtedly a tragedy for all those who died for their relatives, acquaintances, relatives, and in general all the people of Ossetia, not South Ossetia and the Ossetian people. It is indeed a great loss. From the Georgian side killed 219 people. It should be borne in mind that the territory of South Ossetia, were fighting, and in direct military action of Georgia has been no other than the bombing of Georgian towns and villages of Russia's air force, but the ethnic cleansing of the Georgian enclaves of South Ossetian units, mercenaries and Cossacks.
As for the losses of war, the data given here is not so accurate. It's known death toll of Georgian military and police - is 170 people. As for the number of casualties on the other hand, the armed forces and those belonging to members such as, for example, mercenaries and volunteers, some with incomplete data, but scheduling them killed nearly 500 people. In other words, the ratio of casualties of war between, on the one hand, Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia and Georgia, a coalition of about 3 to 1. These losses are huge. And that means, among other things, that it is a tragedy for all those, and above all, for us, for Russian citizens, because they killed our people, whoever they were. Killing our citizens, killing Georgian citizens, were they in uniform or not wearing their uniforms. But, everything else, still shows the level of training of Georgian troops, on the one hand, and Russian, Ossetian, Abkhaz ...
 
Alexander Sharavin: Andrei, official Russia's losses - 64 soldiers.
 
Andrei Illarionov: These figures are incorrect. And you, Alexander, well aware that these figures substantially underestimated, they are false, they were falsified in order to create a distorted picture of the losses suffered by our country as a result of the aggression by Russia's leadership has carried out against Georgia ...
 
Mikhail Sokolov: I am literally the last question. Still, whether in this region is to bring peace to people not to kill?
 
Alexander Sharavin: I think that the world is there to ensure you can, but only by joint efforts, if that would participate actively and the Georgian side. And I think that last statement, at least that I heard from President Saakashvili said that the slight reduction in the euphoria of his hand already felt. At least he understands that his strength is not South Ossetia and Abkhazia did not return. And therefore there is some hope that after all the process from a military plane will go in peace, and once we have peace in the Caucasus.

 
Andrei Illarionov: 30 minutes ago, during the newscast sounded the information that Russia insists that Georgia signed an agreement on nonuse of force against Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This is not news. With such a demanding Russia's authorities are turning to Georgia over the past few years. A Georgia identical within the same the past few years. Georgia says: "We would be happy to do it. We are happy to sign an agreement on nonuse of force in relation to all participants in the process, if a party to this agreement will be Russia. But Russia refused.
It is Russia's refusal to use of force in the South Caucasus and has not led to the first military conflict in the region. And as long as Russia's leadership is trying to create the impression that this is not its military forces crossed an internationally recognized border, it was not her tanks plow foreign countries, this is not its planes bombed the peaceful city, not its missiles kill civilians in Gori, Poti and in other places, to as long as this continues, unfortunately, the risk of renewed war, we remain.

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